

# Political Secularism and Muslim Integration in the West: Assessing the Effects of the French Headscarf Ban\*

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## Abstract

In response to rising immigration flows and the fear of Islamic radicalization, several Western countries have enacted policies to restrict religious expression and emphasize secularism and western values. Despite intense public debate, there is little systematic evidence on how such policies influence the behavior of the religious minorities they target. In this paper, we use rich quantitative and qualitative data to evaluate the effects of the 2004 French headscarf ban on the socioeconomic integration of French Muslim women. We find that the law reduces the secondary educational attainment of Muslim girls, and impacts their trajectory in the labor market and family composition in the long run. We provide evidence that the ban operates through increased perceptions of discrimination and that it reduces assimilation by casting religion and national identities as incompatible.

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# 1 Introduction

Concerns about rising immigration and homegrown radicalization have dominated both European and US politics in recent years, fueling populist far-right parties and driving policy choices of elected political leaders. At the confluence of these two issues lies the large and growing group of Muslim immigrants which has been increasingly perceived as less desirable than other cultural and religious groups (Bansak, Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2016), difficult to assimilate (Bisin et al. 2008), and a threat to Western values (Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004). Either as a direct response to terrorism, or as a means of reaffirming the secular character of the state and society in view of a new and salient religious minority, several governments have enacted policies that regulate Islamic dress, especially the various types of head and face covering worn by Muslim women. As can be seen in Figure 1, about one third of European countries have either a local or national ban on some form of veiling. The type of veiling banned ranges from full-face covers, like the niqab or burqa, to partial ones that cover hair and sometimes neck, like the headscarf. The scope of application also varies, from bans on veiling in all public spaces, to restrictions in specific state or state-funded institutions only (like public services, courts or schools).

[Figure 1 about here.]

Such policies have on various occasions been upheld by the European Court of Justice and survey data indicates that they are supported by a majority of the public in countries where they are debated or enacted.<sup>1</sup> While their intended goal often is to

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<sup>1</sup>A poll by Pew Research Center in 2010 showed that 62% of people in the UK, 82% in France, 71% in Germany and 59% in Spain support a ban on full-face veiling. <http://www.pewglobal.org/2010/07/08/widespread-support-for-banning-full-islamic-veil-in-western-europe/>

reduce the visibility of religion in the public sphere, policies of secularity may inadvertently have other effects on the behavior and choices of the religious minorities they target. Despite the increasing prevalence of these laws in Europe and the widespread public debate on their normative implications, there has been little systematic investigation on their broader effects. And yet this question should be of paramount importance, not only to social scientists, but also to policymakers and Western societies that grapple with achieving both immigrant integration and the preservation of Western culture. To what extent are religious bans contributing towards these goals?

Recent research suggests reasons to doubt the efficacy of bans. Despite approval from native populations, veiling bans targeting Muslim women are perceived as discriminatory by Muslims and many non-Muslims alike.<sup>2</sup> A growing theoretical literature suggests that both discrimination and cultural prohibitions can intensify a minority's sense of identity and, under certain conditions, encourage radicalization (Bisin et al. 2011; Battu, Mwale, and Zenou 2007; Battu and Zenou 2010). Empirically, it has been shown that perceptions of discriminatory treatment among Muslims in the US positively correlate with feelings of sympathy for radical Islam (Lyons-Padilla et al. 2015) and European countries like Belgium or France, which have enacted national veiling bans, have among the greatest flows of foreign fighters to ISIS (Benmelech and Klor 2016). While such correlations do not necessarily imply a causal relationship, they do suggest that the effects of cultural and religious bans may not be innocuous.

This paper is the first attempt to empirically identify the effect of veiling bans on a large range of behavioral and attitudinal outcomes of Muslims. We do so in the context of the most famous of veiling laws, the 2004 French law on secularity and conspicuous religious symbols. The law banned the use of religious signs in primary and secondary public schools in France, and though it did not explicitly single out any particular sym-

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<sup>2</sup>Institut Montaigne (2016) survey a representative sample of French Muslims. They find that 60% support wearing the headscarf in schools and in other public institutions.

bol or religion (large Christian crosses, as well as Sikh turbans and Jewish kippahs were included in the ban), it aimed to and de facto mostly affected veiled Muslim school-girls. Using rich individual-level data from the French Labor Force Survey, the French census, and a representative survey of immigrants in France, we employ a difference-in-differences strategy to isolate the impact of the law on educational and labor market outcomes, as well as on attitudes of Muslim women. We measure educational and socioeconomic outcomes of French-born women with parents from Muslim-majority countries who were just old enough to have been at school when the law was enacted, and compare them to older cohorts who did not experience the ban, and to a variety of control groups, including non-Muslim immigrants and Muslim men.

Our first finding is that exposure to the ban significantly reduces the likelihood of completing secondary education. Part of this effect appears to be driven by a negative impact on enrollment rates in secondary school for Muslim women aged 16 and above – the cohorts that, by French compulsory schooling law, were legally allowed to drop out. We also find that Muslim women affected by the ban took longer to complete secondary education, conditional on their pre-existing age-educational profiles. These higher dropout rates and longer completion times indicate that the ban disrupted the educational progress of Muslim girls. This negative educational shock carries over to a number of longer term outcomes, such as labor force participation, employment rates, and fertility patterns.

We show that these longer run effects of the ban work through two hypothesized pathways: a *discrimination* channel, and an *identity* channel. First, women affected by the ban report increased perceptions of discrimination at school and a lower trust in the French school system. A set of interviews conducted in Paris with religious Muslim women who shared their personal experiences on the 2004 ban corroborates the role of discrimination. As the accounts of interviewees suggest, discriminatory treatment in the public school, as well as outside of it, negatively impacted educational performance, and sometimes even led girls to leave the public school. Second, both survey and

interview evidence highlight the importance of identity channels as potential drivers of our findings. Muslim women were forced to choose between a secular French identity and attachment to their religious practices, a conflict that often led to alienation from the French society. In the data, Muslim women affected by the ban increase their identification with the nationality of their father relatively more than their identification with France. Interestingly however, identification increases both for French and for foreign identities on average. This latter result indicates that the salience of identity and belonging in general increased for affected cohorts. It also points to a potential polarization of identities, as the incompatibility of French and foreign identities was highlighted by the ban.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the tension between increasing Muslim presence and secular values in France, which led to the passage of the 2004 ban against conspicuous religious symbols. We then synthesize a body of theoretical work on the effects of assimilationist policies and discrimination on minority identity, and highlight two distinct mechanisms through which bans on veiling can negatively impact the behavior and attitudes of Muslim women: discrimination and identity (Section 3). In Section 4 we outline the empirical strategy and data that we use to evaluate the impact of the headscarf ban on French-born women of Maghrebi and Middle Eastern origin. In Sections 5 and 6 we investigate the short and long-term effects of the ban on secondary educational attainment and other outcomes, and present evidence that the effects are driven by the hypothesized discrimination and identity channels. In Section 7 we present additional qualitative support for these mechanisms through a set of interviews with French Muslim women. Section 8 concludes with a discussion of the broader significance of our findings for integration policies and of avenues for future research.

## 2 Context

### 2.1 Islam and laïcité in France

Approximately 6 million Muslims live in France (Mattei and Aguilar 2016). The history of their integration has been fraught with difficulties.<sup>3</sup> Current tensions over the assimilability of Muslims can be traced to the 1980s. A religious consciousness arose among third generation French of Muslim origins. Their increased religiosity was a radical deviation from prior generations that maintained only a cultural connection to their Islamic heritage. The reorientation of third generation Muslims to Islam precipitated public anxiety for two reasons. First, Islam was associated with fanaticism and retrogradeness.<sup>4</sup> In the 1980s, fundamentalist Islam was on the rise globally, with restrictions on women’s dress in theocratic Iran, religious war against the Soviets in Afghanistan, and Islamist terrorism in Algeria’s civil war (Piscatoi 1990; Appignanesi and Maitland 1989; Bowen 2007).

Public anxiety over Islam was also rooted in the French approach to religion. French laws, enacted in the late 1800s as part of the anti-clericalism of post-Revolutionary France, relegate faith to the private sphere and strongly regulate organized religion to maintain public order (Mattei and Aguilar 2016). The state’s policies are enshrined in the principle of laïcité (loosely translated as “secularism”). Embodied by several laws, laïcité is meant to ensure freedom of conscience, equality of religious expression, and religious neutrality of government institutions (Messner et al. 2003) – to avoid religious conflict and maintain social order.

Laïcité was importantly enacted through the education system. Public schools were established to combat the influence of the church, replacing religious fealty with nationalism (Kepel 2012). Schools were and remain an important vehicle through which

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<sup>3</sup>For more information, consult Fredette (2014) and Cesari (2009).

<sup>4</sup>For more on French media representation of Islam, see Bowen (2007).

the state creates citizens, instilling in all children republican values (Lorcerie 2012). As Fredette (2014) explains, “Part of France’s *jus soli* [birthright citizenship] tradition is the belief that one is not born French; one becomes French. That process of becoming French is carried out in public schools. It is there that students learn what it means to be French and how to be a good French citizen.” Within this context, the increasing religiosity of Muslims – translated into pupils in headscarves, praying in public settings, requests for halal food (meals prepared as prescribed by Muslim law), and refusal to engage in certain activities (like swimming in mixed gender environments or studying classical art with pictures of nudes) – was perceived as an assault on the very institution instilling republican values (Bowen 2007).

## 2.2 The headscarf ban

Latent anxieties culminated in public crisis. In 1989, three veiled girls attended Gabriel-Havez Middle School. The principal asked them to unveil because headscarves infringed on the neutrality of public schools. When the girls refused, the school expelled them. The students filed suit against the school, and the case reached the Conseil d’Etat (French Supreme Court of administrative law). Ultimately, it ruled that the girls had the right to veil unless their headscarves were disruptive, and it instructed schools to determine disruptiveness on a case by case basis (Mattei and Aguilar 2016). The government also created a ministerial office to help mediate between schools and pupils.

When cases of headscarf expulsion persisted, the government convened a parliamentary commission in 2002 to find a definitive solution. The Stasi Commission – a group of public intellectuals and politicians – consulted relevant stakeholders. Educators reported that headscarves jeopardized the liberating mission of schools “to give citizens-in-the-making the means to free themselves from social, cultural, ethnic or gendered determinism” (Bowen 2007). Headscarves, they argued, impinged on the liberty of conscience of other pupils, and represented the triumph of communitarian pressures (Bowen 2007). Ultimately, the Stasi Report (2004) advocated state intervention – in-

cluding a school ban.

In 2004, the National Assembly passed a bill banning conspicuous religious symbols in schools. The bill broadly refers to ostentatious religious symbols, including large crosses and kippahs. However, headscarves not only motivated the enactment of the law, but also, due to their prevalence among students as compared to other religious symbols, they were the main symbol affected by the law in practice (Paul 2004). The bill went into effect in September 2004 in primary and secondary public schools. It preserved the mediation infrastructure of the prior decades and instructed schools to pursue mediation efforts before imposing penalties on students (Tebbakh 2007).

While no systematic study of the ban exists, there are a few lessons about its impact. The French government sponsored a study of four public schools, culminating in the 2005 Chérifi Report. It painted a positive picture of the ban's implementation, citing a decrease in veiling and expulsions. At the start of the school year in 2004, only 639 out of 10 million students showed up wearing ostentatious religious symbols, 626 of whom were Muslims (Mattei and Aguilar 2016).<sup>5</sup> Of the 639, 143 students switched from public to private schools and 50 enrolled in long-distance courses (Mattei and Aguilar 2016). There is also evidence the ban was applied broadly. Castel and Saby (2011) find that some schools used the ban to bar veiled parents from schools, university professors sometimes adopted the ban (though it only applies to public primary and secondary schools), and young interns were expected not to veil.

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<sup>5</sup>This compares to 3000 cases of wearing religious symbols in 1994-1995, and 1465 cases in 2003-2004 (Mattei and Aguilar 2016; Tebbakh 2007).

### 3 Conceptually linking religious bans to minority outcomes

How would we expect the 2004 ban on religious symbols to affect the behavior and outcomes of French Muslim women? We anticipate that the ban depressed the educational performance and attainment of French Muslim girls enrolled in secondary school during and after its implementation in 2004. We furthermore expect that this had downstream effects on longer-term socioeconomic outcomes of affected cohorts. We combine insights from a rich interdisciplinary literature to identify two classes of mechanisms through which cultural bans can impact a minority group's integration.

The first and more direct one is the de facto discriminatory nature of the law. The law was discriminatory in a specific sense: it singled out Muslim schoolgirls who chose to veil and subjected them to differential treatment because of their mode of dress. During the first phase of the law's implementation, girls who persisted in wearing the headscarf were removed from their classes to discuss alternatives to veiling with school administrators (Mattei and Aguilar 2016). If this failed, girls were expelled. Girls then had several options: they could leave the education system (if 16 or older), switch to private school, opt into distance learning, or leave the country.<sup>6</sup> The process of switching and the period of mediation away from class could have directly impaired school performance.<sup>7</sup>

Besides the direct changes that girls experienced in their everyday school life, the ban's passage was accompanied by a national debate that singled out veiled girls – and predominantly cast their veiling as incompatible with French ideals. This broader

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<sup>6</sup>There are many reasons for lack of compliance with the law. One could be marriage market considerations (Blaydes and Linzer 2008). Prior to the ban, in communities that value pious brides, girls could veil at school without jeopardizing their marriage prospects. If returns to marriage were high enough compared to returns to education, some girls may have left the public school after the ban to avoid removing the veil.

<sup>7</sup>Even the optimistic evaluation of the law in the Chérifi report expressed concerns that the transitional mediation period may have been too long.

public discussion, and the associated anti-Islamic sentiment expressed by segments of the French population, likely reinforced Muslims' difference. A significant literature demonstrates that perceived racism is negatively associated with educational performance (Levy et al. 2016; Chavous et al. 2008). While Islamophobia spurred by the ban might have broadly affected all Muslims, we expect that this effect should be most acute in school-age Muslims because they were in their formative and most impressionable years when the ban was implemented (Wong and Sameroff 2003; Sanders-Phillips 2009; Adam et al. 2015; Brondolo et al. 2009; Dahl 2004). School-age Muslim boys may have also experienced a drop in educational outcomes, but we expect that the effect of the ban was most felt by school-age Muslim girls because the 2004 law pertained directly to them.

The second potential mechanism linking the 2004 ban to lower educational outcomes relates to social and group identity. The 2004 law defined the Muslim headscarf as a “violation of French secularism, and by implication, a sign of the inherent non-Frenchness of anyone who practiced Islam, in whatever form” (Scott 2009). French Muslim girls that could until that point readily identify as members both of their religious community (by wearing the headscarf) and of their country of birth, received the signal that their two identities were incompatible and that one could not be French without embracing the principle of secularity as enshrined in the law. Both theoretical and empirical work on the formation of oppositional identities (Bisin et al. 2011; Fouka 2018) indicate that assimilationist attempts on the part of a majority may strengthen the identity of minority members. In this case, we contend that the headscarf ban led some Muslim girls to resolve this identity conflict by retreating into their religious and ethnic communities. Practically, we expect this retreat to alter behavior in the short- and long-run, for example through reduced participation in the educational system and the labor force.

In sum, we hypothesize that the headscarf ban depressed educational performance and attainment through two pathways: a *discrimination channel*, and an *identity chan-*

*nel.* Under the label discrimination we bundle both the direct consequences of the implementation of the law in the classrooms, and the associated differential treatment either inside the school or outside of it. Discrimination of girls wearing the headscarf may have disrupted their ability or willingness to attend school thereby delaying school completion and worsening educational performance. We also hypothesize that the ban impaired educational and labor market outcomes in the long run. This could have occurred as a direct result of the ban’s negative effect on Muslim girls’ educational attainment. Additionally, the emphasis the law placed on the incompatibility of a religious Muslim identity with being French could have increased some Muslim girls’ identification with the Muslim community and reduced their participation in the education system and the labor market. Finally, based on both the discrimination and the identity channel, we expect Muslim girls from families with two Muslim parents to have been more acutely affected by the ban because these girls are doubly implicated in the public debate, and being part of a family with a unified Muslim identity likely intensifies the conflict between family background and belonging to the French society.

## 4 Data and empirical strategy

### 4.1 Data

We utilize two datasets in our main empirical analysis of the ban’s effect on educational attainment and long-term labor and social outcomes. We describe the data in detail below.

**French Labor Force Survey.** Our main data source is the French Labor Force Survey (Enquête Emploi, and henceforth LFS). The LFS is a comprehensive survey of socioeconomic and labor market characteristics conducted in a representative sample of the French population. It has a rolling panel structure, with each household remaining in the survey for six consecutive quarters. All household members over 15 years of age are interviewed every quarter. For most of our analysis, we keep only the first

quarterly observation of an individual, thus treating the survey as a repeated cross-section. We take advantage of the panel structure of the data in Section 5 in order to better understand the mechanisms behind our observed effects. We restrict the sample to the French born, so as to ensure that we are only examining the behavior of people who went to school in France. We focus on respondents interviewed 2003 to 2012, the range of years in which we can identify the country of birth of both the individual and of the father, and thus the origin of second-generation immigrants. We also restrict attention to individuals who were 20 or older in each survey year, so that we can examine completed education and labor market characteristics.

One limitation for our exercise is lack of information on religion and veiling behavior. French statistics do not collect data on religion and religious practices, and thus we rely on the father's country of birth to identify Muslim women.<sup>8</sup> This information is highly aggregated in the LFS. The variable coding father's origin takes one out of ten values (excluding a code for missing values): France, Northern Europe, Southern Europe, Eastern Europe, Maghreb, Rest of Africa, Middle East, Laos/Vietnam/Cambodia, Rest of the World. We drop from the sample the categories Rest of Africa and Rest of the World, which contain both countries with and without a significant Muslim population. We then code the Maghreb and the Middle East as "Muslim" and all other countries as our "non-Muslim" control group. Our final cross-sectional sample consists of 52,201 observations, out of which 4,163 are Muslim. Our main results are based on the sample of women, but we use men as an additional control group for a number of our analyses.

To verify the robustness of results produced using the LFS, we use information from the 2011 1% sample of the French census microdata, which is part of the International Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS International), collected and distributed by the University of Minnesota. More details on this data source are

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<sup>8</sup>We use the father to identify second-generation Muslims because Islam is patrilineal, passed on through the male line. If we use the mother, LFS results are only slightly attenuated.

provided in the Appendix.

**Survey *Trajectories and Origins*.** To assess the long-run effects of the headscarf ban on the social attitudes of Muslim women, we take advantage of a survey uniquely designed to record the characteristics and attitudes of immigrant populations in France, the survey *Trajectories and Origins* (*Trajectoires et Origines*, henceforth *TeO*). *TeO* was conducted in 2008-2009 on a sample of 21,000 people and included representative samples of immigrants, descendants of immigrants, as well as French without an immigrant background, born in France or in overseas departments. The survey includes religious adherence, which allows us to improve on our earlier identification, by focusing on self-reported Muslim women, without needing to indirectly identify them using the father's country of birth.<sup>9</sup> We restrict attention to women born in France, or those who moved to France before age 6, so as to ensure that everyone in the sample attended school in France.

Tables B.1 and B.2 in the Appendix provide summary statistics on our main outcome variables for women and men, respectively. A complete description of all variables is provided in Appendix Section C.

## 4.2 Identification strategy

To evaluate the effects of the school veiling ban, we employ a difference-in-differences analysis. Our source of cross-sectional variation is Muslim origin. Depending on the outcome of interest, we use two sources of time variation: birth cohorts and survey years. Birth cohort variation (i.e. comparing outcomes of cohorts in school during the ban to those who completed school before the ban) allows us to examine the long-run effect of the law. Yearly variation (i.e. comparing outcomes of everyone before and after the ban's passage in 2004) allows us to identify its immediate impact. We explain

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<sup>9</sup>The *TeO* thus also allows us to verify that our approach for identifying Muslims in the LFS and IPUMS is valid: the correlation between self-reported Islamic religion and an indicator for father born in a Muslim-majority country in the *TeO* sample is 0.7403.

each of these strategies in detail below.

**Cohort variation.** When examining the ban’s effect on educational attainment, as well as other long-term socioeconomic characteristics, we assess how the difference in outcomes between women of Muslim and non-Muslim origin changes for cohorts of school age at the time of the law’s enactment as compared to cohorts just old enough to have left school at the time of the ban. Students in France attend secondary education between the ages of 11 and 18. While attendance is compulsory by law only until the age of 16, the second stage of secondary education (*lycée*) which prepares students for a high school degree, or *baccalauréat*, lasts until the age of 18. Based on this structure of the educational system, we assume that women born in 1985 or earlier, who were 19 years old in 2004, were likely to have already left secondary education and would thus be unaffected by the law. Any cohort born in 1986 or later would instead have had at least one year of education under the new law.<sup>10</sup> These younger cohorts of Muslim girls constitute our treatment group. The distinction between treatment and control group is not sharp – some girls born 1986 or later may have not actually been in school when the ban was implemented – but this only introduces measurement error which would bias any estimated effect towards zero. We always restrict our focus to cohorts born 1980 or later, to ensure a roughly equal amount of observations on either side of the 1986 cutoff.

Our simplest specification takes the form:

$$Y_{icg} = \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 T_{cg} + g_g + c_c + \epsilon_{icg} \quad (1)$$

where  $i$  indexes individuals,  $c$  indexes birth cohorts, and  $g$  indexes groups based on the father’s region (LFS) or country of birth (IPUMS), or the individual’s religion (TeO).  $T_{cg}$  is an indicator for individuals identified as Muslim and who were 18 or

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<sup>10</sup>Figure B.1 in the Appendix shows that close to 100% of women born 1986 or later were enrolled in secondary education in 2003, the year before the implementation of the ban. This share drops to less than 80% for those born in 1985 and to 40% or less for older cohorts.

younger in 2004 (born 1986 or later).  $g_g$  and  $c_c$  are group and birth cohort fixed effects, respectively, and  $\epsilon_{icg}$  is an idiosyncratic error term. The coefficient of interest is  $\alpha_2$ , the differential treatment effect of the ban on schooling age cohorts of Muslim women. When using the LFS, the repeated cross-section structure of the data allows us to simultaneously control for birth year, survey year and age fixed effects, since we observe the same birth cohorts at multiple points in time. Our preferred specification then includes a full set of father’s region of origin by age fixed effects. This is particularly important, since most of our educational and labor force outcomes of interest follow a different age profile for Muslim vs non-Muslim women.

**Yearly variation.** When analyzing the immediate effect of the ban on secondary school enrollment, we use an alternative time dimension as a source of variation. We assess how the difference in the change of student status between fall and spring quarter of the same year for Muslims and non-Muslims varies before and after the ban. We exploit the fact that the LFS has a panel structure, which allows us to observe the same individual in six consecutive quarters, and we track the same person right before and right after the implementation of the law. We run a regression of the form:

$$\Delta Y_{isg} = \beta_1 + \beta_2 T_{sg} + g_g + s_s + \epsilon_{isg} \quad (2)$$

where  $i$  and  $g$  index individuals and groups, as before, and  $s$  indexes survey years.  $T_{sg}$  is an indicator that equals one for Muslim individuals observed in a survey year when the law is already in place. The outcome of interest  $\Delta Y_{isg}$  in this case is the change in student status (in secondary education) from the second to the fourth quarter of survey year  $s$ . As before, we are interested in the direction and magnitude of the coefficient  $\beta_2$ , the differential treatment effect on student enrollment for Muslim women.

**Threats to identification.** The validity of the difference-in-differences approach relies on two identifying assumptions. First, outcomes of Muslim and non-Muslim women would have been following parallel trends in the absence of the law. While this assumption cannot be tested directly, availability of data for older cohorts of women

allows us to demonstrate the absence of any differential pre-trends in outcomes prior to the passage of the law. This rules out the possibility that behavior was already changing for younger cohorts of Muslim women for reasons unrelated to the headscarf ban. Second, there can be no time-variant unobservable factors that coincide temporally with the headscarf ban and differentially affect women of Muslim origin. This assumption is also unlikely to be violated given the nature of the variation we are exploiting: the time dimension for most of our analysis is not years, but birth cohorts. It would have to be the case that any time-variant confounder that differentially affects Muslim girls does so only, or disproportionately, for the younger cohorts. We are not aware of other changes in legislation or rules relating to the educational system that could be correlated with the 2004 ban. It is plausible that general discrimination against Muslims, particularly against veiled Muslim women, either preceded or was a direct consequence of the ban and the associated public discussion. We consider such anti-Muslim sentiment part of the bundle of factors that constituted the “effect” of the law, and not a confounder. To the extent that anti-Muslim sentiment extended to older Muslim women and did not only single out young Muslim women, this will bias downward our estimate of the differential effect of the law on the directly affected group of school-aged Muslim women. We will present evidence of such spillovers of the law on Muslim men in Section 5.

A more concrete threat to identification is a source of discrimination unrelated to the law, such as Islamophobia, initially spurred by the 9/11 attacks in 2001 and still prevalent in later years. There are two reasons why such a concern is unlikely to be important. First, even if such discrimination differentially affected school-age cohorts – an unlikely hypothesis a priori – it would not have manifested with a sharp break in the educational attainment of cohorts just old enough to be in school in 2004. In Appendix Section A.1, we demonstrate with a set of placebo exercises that no cohort born before 1986 displays a significant drop in secondary educational attainment, as we would expect if other sources of discrimination, and not the ban, were the drivers of our findings. Second, part of our difference-in-differences design exploits an entirely

different source of time variation (survey years instead of birth cohorts). It is unlikely that generalized Islamophobia can explain both educational attainment of cohorts born 1986 and later and the change in rates of secondary enrollment of Muslim women between 2003 and 2004.

Finally, it is worth emphasizing at this point that we lack information on who was wearing a headscarf in 2004 and was thus *treated* by the law in the strictest sense. What we are identifying is the effect of the law on women of schooling age who either report being Muslim (TeO) or whose father was born in an identifiable Muslim-majority region or country (LFS, IPUMS). To the extent that schooling-age Muslim women who did not wear a headscarf did not respond at all to the 2004 ban, we would expect an additional downward bias in our estimates. In short, both the potential spillover effects of the law, as well as the lack of precise information on veiling practices, should contribute to estimated treatment effects being a lower bound of actual effects.<sup>11</sup>

## 5 Effects on educational attainment

As discussed in Section 3, the first order effect of the 2004 law should be traceable in educational attainment. Figure 2 separately plots the likelihood of having completed secondary education for Muslim and non-Muslim women in the LFS, conditioning on age and survey year fixed effects. Secondary attainment of Muslim women is generally lower, but follows a parallel trend to non-Muslim women for older cohorts, thus providing support to the main identifying assumption of the difference-in-differences strategy. This pattern ends abruptly with the group born in 1986, precisely the first cohort of women old enough to be affected by the ban while at school. The gap between

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<sup>11</sup>It is also worth pointing out here that prior to the law, regulation of headscarves was decided school by school. A ministry of education circular had established this discretion prior to 2004. Therefore, not all schools were affected equally by the law; some implemented anew the regulations against veiling whereas others maintained the status quo. That some schools did not accommodate veiling prior to 2004 should be an additional factor biasing our estimated effects downwards.

Muslim and non-Muslim women more than doubles with this cohort, and remains large thereafter.

[Figure 2 about here.]

Table 1 clarifies the magnitude and demonstrates the robustness of this result. Column (1) reports the interaction coefficient from equation 1 which suggests that the difference in the likelihood of completing secondary education between Muslim and non-Muslim women becomes almost three percentage points larger for school age cohorts. The effect remains unchanged when controlling for survey year fixed effects in column (2). In column (3) we control flexibly for age by father's birthplace fixed effects, effectively allowing women from different origins to have different age profiles in terms of when they complete secondary education. This increases the magnitude of the estimated coefficient. In column (4), we include a linear Muslim-specific trend in birth year. The coefficient remains robust and further increases in magnitude. This increase likely captures a fact that can be observed in Figure 2: Muslim women born before 1986 were catching up with their non-Muslim counterparts in terms of secondary educational attainment.

The estimated effects are large. The magnitudes imply that the difference between Muslim and non-Muslim women in secondary attainment more than doubles. Our preferred specification reported in column (3) implies that we can attribute to the veiling law a differential increase in the share of Muslim women who fail to finish secondary education of 3.9 percentage points, which corresponds to 20% of the overall share of women without secondary education in our sample (19.1%).

[Table 1 about here.]

Finally, column (5) investigates one important source of the effect's heterogeneity: the origins of the parents. The drop in secondary educational attainment is double in magnitude for women with both parents born in Muslim-majority regions, compared to those with a Muslim father and a non-Muslim mother. Parental origin may proxy for

two things. The first is the intensity of the treatment – girls born in Muslim families are perhaps more likely to wear the headscarf and thus to have been directly affected by the ban. The second relates to the strength of the identity channel in driving responses to the ban. Conditional on having worn the headscarf, women from Muslim families would have faced more of a conflict between their family background and French secular identity compared to their counterparts with parents in mixed marriages.

We perform a wide set of robustness checks to verify the validity of the estimated effect of the ban on the likelihood of completing secondary school. We show that the effect is not driven by other changes coinciding temporally with the headscarf ban, such as general xenophobia and Islamophobia spurred by the 9/11 attacks, or by imbalances across the sample of Muslims and non-Muslims. A detailed description of robustness checks can be found in Section A.1 of the Appendix.

## **5.1 How does the ban reduce educational outcomes?**

Through which pathway does the law have such a negative impact on the educational outcomes of Muslim women? In what follows, we further unpack the process that leads cohorts affected by the ban to attain lower levels of secondary education, and identify two additional effects of the law.

First, Muslim women in affected cohorts are likely to require more time than their counterparts in the control group to complete secondary education. Figure 3 plots the differential treatment effect of the ban, estimated from a flexible version of the specification in equation 1, which interacts Muslim origin with two-year birth cohort dummies. The dependent variable is the likelihood of being enrolled in (but not having completed) secondary education, conditional on a full set of age by father’s birthplace fixed effects. The pattern suggests that cohorts born after 1986 are more likely to be students in high school at any given age. Conditional on differential age trends, Muslim women are on average somewhat more likely to stay in secondary education longer than non-Muslims, but this gap widens for affected cohorts. One reason this may happen,

which would be consistent with observations made in the official evaluations of the ban's effects, is the ban led girls to repeat a class. This could be because of time lost during the mediation period, switches from public to private education, or simply the pernicious effects of discrimination at school on girls' effort and grades.

[Figure 3 about here.]

The increase in enrollment rates in secondary education conditional on age is substantial in magnitude. Muslim women's enrollment rates increase by up to 4 percentage points. Note that among 20 year old non-Muslims, only around 7.9% are still attending secondary education. For Muslims this share is 13.3% – a difference that is largely explained by the estimated effect of the veiling law.

Second, we find evidence that Muslim girls drop out of school in direct response to the law's implementation. The panel nature of the French LFS allows us to examine how the student status of Muslim women changed after 2004. We restrict attention to women enrolled in secondary school in the spring quarter of each school year and who were older than 16 (and thus could have legally dropped out of school if they wanted to). We then compute a proxy for dropping out of school, as the difference in student status between spring quarter and fall quarter of the next school year. This variable takes on the value  $-1$  for individuals who were students in secondary education in the spring quarter, but are not students anymore (in any degree of education) in the fall of the same academic year. We examine how this average difference changes for Muslim girls after 2004, by estimating the specification in equation 2. The results are plotted in Figure 4 for all survey years in our sample. While we only have information on one calendar year before 2004 (the change between spring 2003 and fall 2003), it is clear that this difference is zero and increases by around 6 percentage points in 2004–2005. With the exception of 2006 and 2009, all years after 2004 see an increased dropout rate for Muslim women compared to their non-Muslim counterparts.

[Figure 4 about here.]

Figure B.2 in the Appendix examines the effects of the ban on men's likelihood of dropping out of secondary school, plotted alongside those of women. For men, as for women, there is an increase in the dropout rate in the two years directly following the implementation of the ban. For later years, the difference in the dropout rate returns to pre-2004 levels or even decreases for men. Table 2 demonstrates the robustness of this result to a number of specifications and successive inclusion of fixed effects, both for men and for women. Once again, estimated magnitudes for women are large. The average rate of leaving secondary education in our data is 11.8 percent. Estimates in Table 2 indicate an increase in dropout rates for Muslim women exposed to the law of up to 60 percent of this long run average, a sizable effect.

[Table 2 about here.]

There are two possible explanations for the differential drop in student status for Muslim women after 2004. One possibility is that they complete secondary education, but do not follow their classmates to university. Alternatively, they drop out earlier, before completing secondary education in the first place. Arbitrating between these two scenarios allows us to further test if the observed effect indeed results from the 2004 law: since the ban did not legally pertain to universities, we should not see an immediate reduction in university attendance rates between 2003 and 2004. Instead, the short-run effect should come from drop outs in secondary education.

Table 3 demonstrates that this is indeed the case. Columns (1) and (2) display the differential change in the dropout rate from secondary education for Muslim women in the short (column 1) and long run (column 2). Specifically, column 1 presents the estimated effect of the ban on dropout rates between 2003 and 2004, i.e. during the first year of implementation. Though imprecisely estimated, the effect is negative and larger in the short-run. Columns (3) and (4) present the same differential effect for the dropout rate out of university. Unlike with those in high school, Muslim women enrolled in university are not more likely to drop out in 2004. They do, however, become more likely to drop out in the longer run. Conditional on a full set of parent

birthplace-specific age effects, this finding is consistent with the immediate effects of the law on high school dropout rate carrying on to university in later years. It is also consistent with accounts of Muslim women that discrimination against those who veil was also present in the university in the years following the ban's implementation, even though the official law did not apply to higher education.

[Table 3 about here.]

In sum, our results so far indicate that the 2004 headscarf ban negatively impacted the secondary educational attainment of Muslim women. It also had two additional effects. It led affected cohorts of Muslim women to spend more time completing secondary education. As Tables 2 and 3 show, it also made Muslim women more likely to drop out of secondary school upon implementation of the law, but also in subsequent years. The effect spilled over to Muslim men, though this was limited in magnitude and duration.

To what extent were these facts the result of discrimination faced by these cohorts in school? While we cannot precisely test how much of the effect is due to discrimination, we can show that affected cohorts faced more intense discrimination at school than the control group. To this purpose, we apply our difference-in-differences specification to the TeO survey. Figure 5 plots the interaction coefficient from equation 1 in the sample of French-born women born 1980-1994. Columns 1–2 of Table B.3 in the Appendix report the magnitudes associated with these effects, as well as a comparison of the differential effect between men and women, in a triple differences specification. Affected cohorts are significantly more likely to say that they have experienced racism (in the form of insults or harassment) in school. They are also more likely to report lower trust in the French school. These results show that Muslim girls were differentially treated in schools, and thus work as evidence for a discrimination channel driving results on educational outcomes.

[Figure 5 about here.]

## 6 Effects on long-run socioeconomic integration

We next proceed to examine how the headscarf ban affected a larger set of longer term outcomes. We are unable to precisely distinguish what part of these effects is the direct result of lower educational attainment, and what part was independently produced through the mechanisms highlighted in Section 3. Our analysis of the TeO does, however, provide suggestive quantitative evidence for both the role of discrimination and that of identity. We complement and further strengthen this evidence with qualitative data from interviews in Section 7.

Our analysis here mirrors that presented in Table 1, using as dependent variables a number of different outcomes: labor force participation, employment, co-habitation with one's parents, the likelihood of being married, and number of children. In Table 4, we estimate our preferred specification of equation 1, which includes a full set of survey and age fixed effects interacted with father's region or country of birth. Affected cohorts of Muslim women are almost 3 percentage points more likely to be out of the labor force and 3.7 percentage points less likely to be employed. They are also 2.4 percentage points more likely to live with their parents. Finally, while we find a small (negative) difference in the likelihood of marriage, affected cohorts are almost 4 percentage points more likely to have children.

[Table 4 about here.]

Both the labor market and social effects are substantial. When comparing them to the difference between Muslim and non-Muslim women among untreated cohorts, the estimated magnitudes indicate that the veiling law widens the gap with respect to employment by more than a third (initial gap of 10.9%) and the gap with respect to labor force participation by more than half (initial gap of 5.3%). The gap between Muslims and non-Muslims in cohabitation with parents increases by a similar amount (more than a third of the initial gap of 6.9%). Reassuringly, we find similar patterns when we replicate our results in the 2011 1% sample of the French census. These are

discussed in Section A.2 of the Appendix.

Finally, we use the TeO data to provide evidence that the 2004 ban had an impact on social identity. Figure 6 reports differential effects on various self-reported measures of identity for school age cohorts of Muslim women.<sup>12</sup> Affected cohorts are less likely (though not significantly so) to report higher levels of agreement with the statement “I am seen as French,” but not less likely to say that they feel at home in France. Surprisingly, treated cohorts are more likely to identify both as French, and with their father’s country of origin, though on average, identification tends to increase more with the father’s origin than with France. This indicates that identity, whether French or foreign, became a more salient issue for cohorts affected by the law. Models of oppositional identity formation (Bisin et al. 2011) would suggest that attempts at assimilation have a polarizing effect, by forcing individuals to identify with one of two incompatible identities. While we find some indication of this effect here – since Muslim women identify relatively more with their father’s background on average – our results do not fully support the predictions of such models. The headscarf ban may have cast Muslim identity as incompatible with French ideals, but the TeO results suggest that Muslim women respond to this by reaffirming their belonging to both France and their ethnic and religious communities.

[Figure 6 about here.]

## 7 Qualitative evidence on mechanisms

To complement our empirical analysis, as well as provide evidence particularly on the mechanisms driving our long-term estimated effects, we leverage qualitative interviews.

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<sup>12</sup>Columns 3–7 of Table B.3 in the Appendix report the magnitudes associated with these effects, as well as a comparison of the differential effect between men and women, in a triple differences specification.

The experiences of young Muslim respondents show how the discriminatory environment present after the 2004 ban impaired women’s educational and career trajectories. Interviews also reveal a split in the attitudes and behaviors of young Muslim women. The incompatibility of the Muslim and French identities, signaled by the ban and reinforced by the media, drove some respondents to withdraw from French society while others reasserted their belonging to both French and Muslim communities.

This section draws on interviews with 20 Muslim women conducted by one of the authors in Paris in July-August 2011. Information about sampling strategy and data collection is provided in Appendix Section D. Importantly, the respondent pool is diverse in terms of age, ranging from 18 to 47, as well as immigrant origins, including sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa, Turkey, and Pakistan. Because we anticipate the headscarf ban to have negatively affected younger cohorts who were in the education system in 2004, the age distribution of respondents enables us to corroborates that older cohorts were unaffected by the ban. Summary statistics on the characteristics of interviewees are provided in Table D.2 in the Appendix.<sup>13</sup>

## 7.1 Discrimination channel

Interviews indicate that the ban generated differential treatment of Muslim women in educational institutions and the labor market, thereby impeding Muslim women’s advancement. First the law instituted a de facto discriminatory regime in primary and secondary education, wherein veiled girls were the primary targets of the new regulations. Twenty-eight-year-old Nadia shared her own experience of expulsion.<sup>14</sup> Nadia started veiling at 13. When she veiled at school, her teachers were dismayed but failed to convince her to unveil. The school ultimately expelled her and engaged a govern-

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<sup>13</sup>These interviews were approved by Yale University’s Human Subjects Committee under IRB protocol 1005006869.

<sup>14</sup>Names have been changed to preserve anonymity. Her expulsion occurred prior to the 2004 ban, when an education circular enabled schools to adopt their own regulations. She attended a school where veils were not allowed.

ment mediator to resolve the impasse. Her parents, concerned about her education, convinced her to unveil in school.<sup>15</sup> That process took a significant amount of time and led her to fall behind relative to her peers. Her experience illustrates how the law directly altered the lives of veiled Muslim girls, with the potential to undermine their academic performance.

Even for girls who obeyed school veiling regulations or did not veil at all, the 2004 law contributed to an environment more hostile to Muslim girls more broadly. An anti-islamophobia lawyer reported, “For those who remained, there was an enormous psychological effect. They are made to feel like culprits but they have done nothing. Despite that, they are humiliated, and [they] do not understand why they are insulted or made to feel like outsiders.”<sup>16</sup> Interviewees who were in the education system in 2004 recall an environment of scrutiny and suspicion after the passage of the ban. Respondents in schools with predominantly French-origin peers were asked to serve as representatives of the Muslim community; they were challenged to disprove the benefits of the ban: its preservation of secularism, its liberation of Muslim women from religious pressure, and its assimilation of a community that claimed to be French but preserves its difference.<sup>17</sup> The stereotypes and interrogations placed Muslim girls, particularly highly religious ones, under considerable stress, and “the more discussion [of the ban], the more one is alienated”.<sup>18</sup>

## 7.2 Identity channel

The law also signaled that veiling was not compatible with the French identity. The narrative of the inconsistency of the Islamic and French identities was reinforced by the national media as well as enacted through the formal enforcement of the law in

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<sup>15</sup>Author interview, July 2011.

<sup>16</sup>Author interview, July 2011

<sup>17</sup>Author interview, July 2011

<sup>18</sup>Author interview, July 2011

schools and its unauthorized application in higher education. Respondents were all keenly aware of the alleged incompatibility of their Muslim and French identities, but they differed in their reactions. Some rejected the false choice between identities and reasserted their right to be both French and Muslim. One respondent proclaimed that she was born in France, she speaks the language, and she respects the laws, and therefore she was as French as any other citizen. She, and others, insisted on integrating on their terms, maintaining their veils and French values. A few interviewees used activism at university or through civic associations to affirm their dual identities.<sup>19</sup> One such activist explained, “But for me, I think that it [retreating, giving up] is not the solution at all. I think it is necessary to cling on... when you hang on, you make advancements.”<sup>20</sup> In contrast, other respondents chose to retreat into their Muslim identity. This retreat took many forms, such as attending a school where children of immigrants predominate, applying to work in Muslim-owned businesses, and moving to immigrant-dominated suburbs.<sup>21</sup> One woman interviewed left work altogether and began wearing the burqa. She explains her decision, “you can do what you want without limitations if you have bad intentions. But there is persecution [of those who want to do good]. It is the hypocrisy of France. They teach in schools [that we are free] but then they close off all of your options; they do not accept you at all [if you do not conform].”<sup>22</sup>

The dynamics described here were reported by Muslim women born between 1983 and 1990. Respondents born in the 1960s and 1970s were not personally impacted by the ban, neither were those born after 1990. Rokhaya, a French-Senegalese woman born in 1976, describes an adolescence without a relentless focus on Islam and veiling. When she started working in 1998, she experienced no pushback against her religious practice

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<sup>19</sup>Author interviews with three respondents, July 2011.

<sup>20</sup>Author interview, July 2011.

<sup>21</sup>One respondent in particular reported that the persecution she felt pushed her to become much more insular and closer to her family. (Author interview, July 2011.)

<sup>22</sup>Author interview, July 2011.

at work, including covering her hair and praying.<sup>23</sup> These cohort differences provide evidence that Muslim girls in school in 2004 were most affected by the headscarf law relative to older cohorts.

## 8 Discussion and conclusion

Do bans on religious expression affect minority integration? In this paper we systematically investigate the effects of the 2004 French headscarf ban and show that the integration of Muslim women was negatively impacted by the law along a number of dimensions. Affected cohorts of Muslim women are less likely to complete secondary education, more likely to drop out of secondary school after the law's enactment, and more likely to take longer to complete secondary education. Long-term socioeconomic outcomes and attitudes are also affected. Treated cohorts have lower rates of labor force participation and employment, and are more likely to have more children. A combination of quantitative and qualitative evidence suggests that these results are primarily driven by two mechanisms. The first one is discrimination, either through the policy itself or through negative attitudes surrounding and accompanying its implementation. This manifested in school, with direct consequences for educational performance and enrollment, but also in university and in the labor market. The second mechanism is the strengthening of Muslim identity and the weakening of ties with France, which led women affected by the ban to retreat into their communities and avoid interaction with the broader society.

We emphasize these two mechanisms, as the mediators of observed effects most supported by our evidence. They do not, however, exhaust the set of potential channels at work. The headscarf ban may affect outcomes by interfering with other functions that veiling performs for women who use it, such as signaling adherence to the norms

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<sup>23</sup>Author interview, July 2011.

of the religious community. Studies such as Carvalho (2012), Patel (2012), and Aksoy and Gambetta (2016) suggest that pious Islamic dress is used by Muslim women as a commitment device which, by affirming their religiosity to the community, allows them to work and otherwise participate in the broader society. By removing this signaling mechanism, veiling bans can thus have the perverse effect of increasing religiosity and decreasing integration. There are a few different reasons to think that school-age girls may substitute away from veiling to other signals of religious commitment. As the third generation is more religious than prior generations, signaling religious piety, in general or to peers, is more important than in prior generations. Moreover, parents, who are particularly religious could have played a role in these substitution decisions. Some of the documented effects of the law involved girls switching from public to private schools or to distance learning so that they would not have to remove their head covers (Mattei and Aguilar 2016). For students or parents who did not have the means to switch in that way, substitution could have manifested with increased monitoring of behavior and increased emphasis on religious behavior outside the school. Such behaviors could have a lasting impact on girls' religiosity, and associated attitudes towards female education or labor force participation in the long run.<sup>24</sup> These behaviors would also be consistent with the identity channel we document above, though we lack the data to identify whether signaling considerations played an additional role in Muslim women's decisions.

Our paper makes four main contributions. First, we are the first to causally assess the impact of veiling laws in general and of the French 2004 law in particular. Given the increasing prevalence of these laws, the support they garner both from native populations and European courts, as well as the intense debate surrounding them, a systematic positive evaluation of their effects was prominently absent. Second, we contribute to a

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<sup>24</sup>The work of Meyersson (2014) in Turkey provides an interesting test of a similar hypothesis in the reverse setup. In Turkey, female educational outcomes improved in municipalities with higher Islamic representation in the local government, consistent with the interpretation that an education more aligned with religious norms may increase educational investment of both parents and schoolchildren.

growing theoretical and empirical literature on the effects of assimilationist policies on minority outcomes and identity, which so far has produced conflicting results. Though some theoretical studies suggest the likelihood of a minority reaction to assimilationist attempts (Bisin et al. 2011; Carvalho 2012), others discount such a possibility (Alesina and Reich 2013), and empirical work has produced conflicting evidence. Feir (2016) and Gregg (2018) suggest that even the legacy of assimilationist Native American boarding schools in the US and Canada can be positive for individuals and communities in terms of economic indicators. At the same time, Fouka (2018) finds that forced monolingualism intensifies minority self-identification, but that such effects are characterized by substantial heterogeneity in responses depending on the initial degree of assimilation and minority identity. Our study shows that religious bans can have a similar negative effect on integration, but makes substantial progress compared to existing literature in identifying the mechanisms behind this effect.

Third, we provide new evidence on the effects that discrimination has for immigrant behavior and integration outcomes. Theoretically, one potential effect of discrimination is that it induces minority group members to disassociate themselves from the minority group and assimilate into the majority in order to avoid being singled out. Fouka (2017) finds evidence for such effects in the behavior of German immigrants in the US during the period of heightened anti-Germanism that followed World War I. At the same time, it is also theoretically possible that discrimination can lead to alienation or radicalization. Adida, Laitin, and Valfort (2014) use behavioral games to show that discrimination against Muslims and alienation of the latter coexist in a “discriminatory” equilibrium in France. Gould and Klor (2015) show that the integration of Muslim immigrants in the US was substantially hindered after 9/11, and more so in states that saw a higher rise in hate crime. Mitts (2018) shows that online Islamic radicalization correlates with patterns of right-wing voting in Europe. In the absence of exogenous variation in discrimination none of these studies identifies a causal effect of discrimination on immigrant behavior. Our study contributes to this literature by isolating a

causal effect of the veiling ban on Muslim outcomes and providing multiple pieces of evidence that indicate that the effect is driven by discrimination of Muslim women at school.

Finally, our study contributes to a broader debate on the success of multiculturalist policies. Wright and Bloemraad (2012) and Bloemraad and Wright (2014) have attempted to place countries on a spectrum of multiculturalism and assess the impact of multiculturalist policies on immigrant integration. Their findings suggest that multiculturalism has modest positive effects for the first generation and no discernible effects for the second generation. By moving beyond cross-country correlations and focusing on the evaluation of a specific policy, our study informs the debate on the merits of multiculturalism by providing causal evidence that policies with an assimilationist character can hinder integration. Evaluating the impacts of specific integration policies can be a useful complementary approach to broader overviews of country policy packages, and a fruitful avenue for future research on immigration and integration.

It is worth emphasizing at this point, that important potential effects of the ban are not easy to assess with existing data. Theoretical work on cultural transmission (Bisin and Verdier 2001; Bisin et al. 2011) suggests that assimilationist policies, cultural bans and native discrimination have long-run multi-generational implications for the dynamics of minority identity. One of the potential impacts of veiling bans highlighted by Carvalho (2012) is their potential to increase religiosity and minority identification among younger generations. To what extent policies like the headscarf ban affect the incentives of second-generation immigrants to acculturate their children, and the implications this may have for minority identity in the long-run are important questions that remain unanswered. We leave such questions to future research.

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
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
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Figure 1. Prevalence of laws regulating veiling across Europe




Source: European Commission (2017) and Open Society Foundations (2018). On the left, the map visualizes the status of headscarf bans. National or local laws refer to bans implemented broadly in the public sphere or specific contexts such as schools or courts. On the right, the map visualizes the status of national bans on the full-face veil (burqa or niqab).

Figure 2. Probability of having completed secondary education by birth cohort for French-born women




The figure plots residuals, aggregated over two-year cohorts, from a regression of an indicator for completed secondary education on age and survey year fixed effects. The sample consists of French-born women born after 1980 and who were at least 20 years old at survey year. Data is from the 2004 to 2012 waves of the LFS. Circle size is proportional to sample size. The vertical line corresponds to 1986, the first birth cohort impacted by the ban.

Figure 3. Likelihood of being a student in secondary education, conditional on age




The figure plots estimates of the interaction coefficient between Muslim origin and 2-year birth cohorts from a regression of an indicator for being in secondary school, that additionally controls for survey year and father's birthplace by age fixed effects. Vertical lines denote 90% confidence intervals. The sample consists of French-born women born after 1980 and who were at least 20 years old at survey year. Data is from the 2004–2012 waves of the LFS.

Figure 4. Change in student status between spring and fall quarter, difference Muslim women vs others




The figure plots estimates of the interaction coefficient between Muslim origin and survey year fixed effects from a regression of an indicator for changed student status between fall and spring quarter of the same school year, that also controls for survey year, birth cohort and father's birthplace by age fixed effects. Vertical lines denote 90% confidence intervals. The sample consists of French-born women aged 16 or above at survey year, who were enrolled in secondary education in the spring quarter of the previous year. Data is from the 2004–2012 LFS.

Figure 5. Effects on self-reported attitudes related to school



The figure plots coefficient estimates and 90% confidence intervals from the interaction between Muslim religion and an indicator for individuals born after 1986. The regression controls for birth cohort and religion fixed effects, as well as for a linear Muslim-specific age trend. The sample consists of French-born women born after 1980. Outcomes are standardized and estimated effects can be interpreted in terms of standard deviations. Data is from the Trajectories and Origins survey.

Figure 6. Effects on self-reported attitudes related to identity



The figure plots coefficient estimates and 90% confidence intervals from the interaction between Muslim religion and an indicator for individuals born after 1986. The regression controls for birth cohort and religion fixed effects, as well as for a linear Muslim-specific age trend. The sample consists of French-born women born after 1980. Outcomes are standardized and estimated effects can be interpreted in terms of standard deviations. Data is from the Trajectories and Origins survey.

Table 1. Effect on the probability of having completed secondary education

Dep. Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Completed secondary education				
Muslim $\times$ Born after 1986	-0.0295*** (0.00776)	-0.0291*** (0.00771)	-0.0386*** (0.00343)	-0.0712*** (0.00805)	
Muslim father only $\times$ Born after 1986					-0.0233*** (0.00298)
Muslim father and mother $\times$ Born after 1986					-0.0488*** (0.00776)
Observations	45265	45265	45265	45265	45265
R-squared	0.00456	0.00548	0.00985	0.00994	0.0117
Birth year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Father's birthplace FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Survey year FE		✓	✓	✓	✓
Age $\times$ Father's birthplace FE			✓	✓	✓
Muslim-specific linear trend				✓	✓

**Notes:** The sample consists of French-born women born after 1980 and who were at least 20 years old at survey year. Data is from the 2004–2012 waves of the LFS. “Muslim” refers to women whose father was born in the Maghreb or the Middle East. Standard errors are clustered at the father’s birthplace level. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

Table 2. Change in student status between spring and fall quarter

Dep. Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Change in student status				
	Panel A: Women				
Muslim $\times$ 2004 or later	-0.0268 (0.0278)	-0.0701* (0.0365)	-0.0662** (0.0302)	-0.0542*** (0.0163)	-0.0561*** (0.0178)
Observations	8667	8667	8667	8667	1387
R-squared	0.00383	0.0984	0.100	0.107	0.136
	Panel B: Men				
Muslim $\times$ 2004 or later	-0.00333 (0.0343)	-0.00932 (0.0329)	-0.00774 (0.0332)	-0.0142 (0.0471)	0.0315 (0.0303)
Observations	8462	8462	8462	8462	1479
R-squared	0.00453	0.0943	0.0974	0.104	0.160
Survey year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Father's birthplace FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Age FE		✓	✓	✓	✓
Birth year FE			✓	✓	✓
Age $\times$ Father's birthplace FE				✓	✓
Sample 2003-2004					✓

**Notes:** The dependent variable is student status in quarter 4, difference from quarter 2. The sample is restricted to French-born individuals older than 16, who were in secondary education 2 quarters before. Data is from the 2003–2012 LFS. Standard errors clustered at the father's birthplace level. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

Table 3. Likelihood of being in secondary or tertiary education, conditional on age

Dep. Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	In secondary		In university	
Muslim $\times$ 2004 or later	-0.0496 (0.232)	-0.0114 (0.0525)	0.00766 (0.209)	-0.0342 (0.0410)
Observations	1387	8667	1387	8667
R-squared	0.230	0.201	0.169	0.172
Survey year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Birth year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Age $\times$ Father's birthplace FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sample 2003-2004	✓		✓	

**Notes:** The sample is restricted to French-born women older than 16, who were in secondary education 2 quarters before. Data is from the 2003–2012 LFS. Standard errors clustered at the father's birthplace level. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

Table 4. Effect on long-term outcomes

Dep. Variable	Out of labor force (1)	Employed (2)	Lives with parents (3)	Has children (4)	Married (5)
Muslim $\times$ Born after 1986	0.0288** (0.00875)	-0.0370*** (0.00461)	0.0242** (0.00655)	0.0398*** (0.00993)	-0.00912** (0.00285)
Observations	45289	45289	45289	9836	45286
R-squared	0.183	0.174	0.244	0.0347	0.132
Birth year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Father's birthplace FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Father's birthplace $\times$ Age FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

**Notes:** The sample consists of French-born women born after 1980 and who were at least 20 years old at survey year. Data is from the 2004–2012 waves of the LFS. “Muslim” refers to women whose father was born in the Maghreb or the Middle East. Standard errors are clustered at the father’s birthplace level. \*\*\* p < 0.01, \*\* p < 0.05, \* p < 0.1.

# Appendix (Not for publication)

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
## A Robustness checks

### A.1 Ruling out alternative explanations for effects on educational attainment

We perform a wide set of checks to verify the validity of the estimated effect of the ban on the likelihood of completing secondary school. Figure A.1 is a replication of Figure 2 for a set of different comparisons that constitute plausible placebo checks. If the effect estimated in the previous section is indeed resulting from the veiling ban, rather than from general discrimination or other events, then it should be more pronounced for Muslim women, as compared to Muslim men. This is indeed what we observe. The upper panel of Figure 2 plots the conditional likelihood of completing secondary education in the sample of men, comparing Muslims to non-Muslims. There is somewhat of a dip in educational attainment for cohorts born in 1986 or 1987, but the drop is not as pronounced as for women. Though the trend for Muslim men is more of a continuation of an earlier trend and rebounds for younger cohorts, it is still potentially reflective of an indirect effect of the law.

Similarly, if the estimated effect is resulting from a general increase in xenophobia, potentially targeting women more directly, we should observe a similar drop in educational attainment of cohorts born 1986 or later for all immigrant groups. This is not what we find. The middle and lower panels of Figure A.1 focus on the sample of women, but define as treated two groups of second-generation immigrant women that should not have been affected by the ban: Southern Europeans (the largest group of second generation immigrants in France after those from the Maghreb) and those born in Laos, Vietnam or Cambodia. Despite smaller sample sizes, there is no pattern that mirrors that for Muslim women and that would indicate that confounding factors are affecting the educational profiles of younger cohorts of second generation immigrants in general.

Figure A.1. Placebo results for men and non-Muslim second generation immigrant women



The figure plots residuals, aggregated over two-year cohorts, from a regression of an indicator for completed secondary education on age and survey year fixed effects. The sample consists of French-born men (upper panel) or women (middle and lower panel) born after 1980 and who were at least 20 years old at survey year. Data is from the 2004 to 2012 waves of the LFS. Circle size is proportional to sample size.

To address any concerns that the drop in completed secondary education for younger cohorts reflects discrimination spurred by 9/11, we run additional placebo regressions. Table A.1 reports the interaction coefficient of our preferred specification (that reported in Column (3) of Table 1) when using each cohort in our sample as an alternative cutoff for treatment. Only 1986 corresponds to a large and significant negative effect on educational attainment. Importantly, almost all coefficients for cohorts born before 1986 are near zero, indicating that our findings are not merely the continuation of a trend that started in 2001.

Our difference-in-differences design does not require that Muslims and non-Muslims are balanced in terms of their characteristics in order to deliver estimates of causal effects. The validity of the design only requires that any difference between the two groups would have remained constant in the absence of the headscarf ban. Figure 2 and the robustness of our results to controlling for pre-trends and alternative cutoffs indicate the absence of differential pre-trends in secondary educational attainment between Muslims and non-Muslims. Nonetheless, to further ensure that any differential effect is not driven by a time-varying change in other characteristics of the sample, we combine difference-in-differences with a balancing exercise in the spirit of Ladd and Lenz (2009). We use entropy balancing (Hainmueller 2012) to balance Muslims and non-Muslims in terms of pre-treatment covariates. The method generates a set of weights, that, when applied to the original sample, balance selected moments of the treatment and control group. We match the means of the following pre-treatment characteristics available in the LFS: a full set of age dummies, a set of indicators for different categories of urbanization, and an indicator for individuals living in *sensitive urban zones* (Zones urbaines sensibles, ZUS), urban areas with high unemployment, a low percentage of high school graduates and a high percentage of public housing, which are specifically targets for state policy in France. Table A.2 in the Appendix presents characteristics of the balanced and unbalanced samples, and Table A.3 replicates our main results after applying entropy balance weights. Both the size and the significance of the coefficients

Table A.1. Effect on the probability of completing secondary education - Placebo cohorts

Dep. Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Muslim × Born after 1981	-0.00903 (0.0226)											
Muslim × Born after 1982		0.0148 (0.0158)										
Muslim × Born after 1983			0.00183 (0.0174)									
Muslim × Born after 1984				-0.00303 (0.00667)								
Muslim × Born after 1985					0.00176 (0.00278)							
Muslim × Born after 1986						-0.0386*** (0.00343)						
Muslim × Born after 1987							-0.0198 (0.0104)					
Muslim × Born after 1988								-0.00262 (0.00527)				
Muslim × Born after 1989									0.0306*** (0.00303)			
Muslim × Born after 1990										0.0181** (0.00539)		
Muslim × Born after 1991											0.000504 (0.00225)	
Muslim × Born after 1992												0.00961 (0.0178)
Observations	45265	45265	45265	45265	45265	45265	45265	45265	45265	45265	45265	45265
R-squared	0.00972	0.00973	0.00972	0.00972	0.00972	0.00985	0.00975	0.00972	0.00978	0.00974	0.00972	0.00972

**Notes:** The sample consists of French-born women born after 1980 and who were at least 20 years old at survey year. Data is from the 2004–2012 waves of the LFS. “Muslim” refers to women whose father was born in the Maghreb or the Middle East. All regressions control for survey, cohort and age by father’s region of origin fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the father’s birthplace level. \*\*\* p < 0.01, \*\* p < 0.05, \* p < 0.1.

remain largely unaffected.

Table A.2. Covariate balance before and after applying entropy balance weights

Variables	Muslim	Non-Muslim (unweighted)	Non-Muslim (weighted)
Age 21	0.102	0.120	0.102
Age 22	0.092	0.118	0.093
Age 23	0.098	0.112	0.098
Age 24	0.089	0.091	0.089
Age 25	0.097	0.076	0.097
Age 26	0.084	0.067	0.084
Age 27	0.075	0.058	0.075
Age 28	0.063	0.048	0.063
Age 29	0.047	0.040	0.047
Age 30	0.037	0.031	0.037
Age 31	0.023	0.022	0.023
Age 32	0.012	0.010	0.012
Rural	0.033	0.045	0.033
Less than 15,000 inhabitants	0.007	0.014	0.007
15,000 – 19,999 inhabitants	0.004	0.008	0.004
20,000 – 24,999 inhabitants	0.010	0.022	0.010
25,000 – 34,999 inhabitants	0.011	0.022	0.011
35,000 – 44,999 inhabitants	0.011	0.024	0.011
50,000 – 99,999 inhabitants	0.060	0.073	0.060
100,000 – 199,999 inhabitants	0.087	0.097	0.087
200,000 – 499,999 inhabitants	0.145	0.191	0.145
500,000 – 9,999,999 inhabitants	0.339	0.253	0.339
Paris	0.266	0.158	0.266
ZUS	0.225	0.061	0.225

**Notes:** The sample consists of French-born women born after 1980 and who were at least 20 years old at survey year. Data is from the 2004–2012 waves of the LFS. “Muslim” refers to women whose father was born in the Maghreb or the Middle East.

Table A.3. Robustness: Effect on the probability of completing secondary education, entropy balance weights

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dep. Variable	Completed secondary education			
Muslim $\times$ Born after 1986	-0.0276** (0.00882)	-0.0280** (0.00832)	-0.0429*** (0.00209)	-0.0662*** (0.0111)
Observations	45255	45255	45255	45255
R-squared	0.0102	0.0115	0.0197	0.0199
Birth year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Father's birthplace FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Survey year FE		✓	✓	✓
Age $\times$ Father's birthplace FE			✓	✓
Muslim-specific linear trend				✓

**Notes:** The sample consists of French-born women born after 1980 and who were at least 20 years old at survey year. Entropy balance weights applied, matching the mean of a set of age indicators, eleven indicators for levels of urbanizations and an indicator for residence in ZUS areas. Data is from the 2004–2012 waves of the LFS. “Muslim” refers to women whose father was born in the Maghreb or the Middle East. Standard errors are clustered at the father’s birthplace level. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

## A.2 Replicating LFS results using census microdata


To verify the robustness of the results in LFS, we use information from the 2011 1% sample of the French census microdata, which is part of the International Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS International), collected and distributed by the University of Minnesota.<sup>25</sup> This dataset records parents' country of origin only for individuals whose parents are observed to live with them in the same household. While this is an unrepresentative sample of all individuals in our age range of interest, differences between this subsample and the broader population are not very large.<sup>26</sup> In any case, our empirical estimates of the ban's effect remain internally valid within this subsample. As in the LFS, we restrict our attention to the native born and code as "Muslim" women whose father was born in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, or Turkey and as "non-Muslim" those with fathers born in Italy, Portugal, Spain, France, or the European Union. We drop from the sample those with fathers born in non-specified parts of Europe, of Africa, or the rest of the world, which cannot be identified as predominantly Muslim. Figure A.2 shows the distribution of second-generation Muslim women by father's country of origin (upper panel), and plots differences in key variables between Muslim and non-Muslim French-born women (lower panel) in the IPUMS dataset. Second generation Muslim women are about 2 percentage points less likely to have completed secondary education than other French-born women, and about 6 percentage points less likely to be employed. Our empirical analysis demonstrates that these cross-sectional differences were amplified for cohorts affected by the 2004 ban.

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<sup>25</sup>The 2011 1% French IPUMS sample combines data from 2009 to 2013. The 2006 sample combines data from 2004 to 2008. Since the precise year of data collection is not specified, we cannot identify and exclude those observations that were collected before the passage of the 2004 ban (the first half of 2004). We thus chose not to use the 2006 sample.

<sup>26</sup>Compared to the full sample of women aged 20–33 in 2011, those living with their parents were 2 percentage points less likely to have completed secondary education and 1 percentage point less likely to be in the labor force.

Figure A.2. Second generation French women with father from Muslim-majority country



Source: 2011 IPUMS France. The sample consists of women aged 20–33 at census time. “Muslim” refers to women whose father was born in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia or Turkey. The upper panel shows the distribution of second-generation Muslim women by father’s country of origin. The lower panel plots differences in key variables between Muslim and non-Muslim French-born women.

Table A.4 replicates the specification in equation 1 in the IPUMS sample. Results are consistent with those from the LFS not just in direction, but also in magnitude. Column (1) replicates our main finding in the LFS on secondary educational attainment. The estimated (negative) impact of the law on secondary education completion for affected cohorts is 2.9 percentage points, essentially identical to that estimated in the LFS. Women are 0.5 p.p. more likely to be out of the labor force and 2.1 p.p. less likely to be employed. As before, we estimate near zero effects for the likelihood of marriage,

but we do find a near-significant positive effect on the likelihood of marrying someone from the same country of origin as the father for those women who are married. We estimate an identical increase in the likelihood of having children as in the LFS.

Given that in the IPUMS analysis we can only use data from one census year, we are unable to control for differential age profiles of women by their father's birthplace. The comparability of the estimates to those of the LFS suggests this matters little. In any case, to increase confidence in our findings, in Panel B of Table A.4 we repeat our analysis with a sample of Muslim men in the same age range. As in the LFS, we find a small negative effect of the law on secondary attainment of school age cohorts of Muslim men. This is additional evidence of the presence of a spillover effect of the law on Muslim school aged boys. However, with the exception of a lower likelihood of marriage for younger cohorts of Muslim men, no other outcome responds to the law. There are two, non-mutually exclusive ways to interpret this finding. First, lower educational attainment is more likely to affect later outcomes for women, rather than for men, especially given the larger magnitude of the estimated effect. Second, while the law impacted Muslim boys through mechanisms related to school and school performance, the effect on women also worked through additional channels related to identity choices, as discussed in Section 3.


Table A.4. Robustness: Effect on long-term outcomes in census microdata

Dep. Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Completed secondary	Out of labor force	Employed	Married	Endogamous marriage	Has children
Panel A: Women						
Muslim $\times$ Born after 1986	-0.0287*** (0.00358)	0.00500** (0.00213)	-0.0214** (0.00678)	0.00344 (0.00280)	0.122 (0.0910)	0.0284*** (0.00331)
Observations	203724	203724	203724	203724	872	203724
R-squared	0.00413	0.00281	0.0532	0.00775	0.288	0.0223
Panel B: Men						
Muslim $\times$ Born 1986 or later	-0.0187*** (0.00449)	-0.00124 (0.00233)	-0.00555 (0.00608)	-0.0282** (0.0101)	-0.0362 (0.0459)	-0.00690 (0.00814)
Observations	310370	310370	310370	310370	1878	310370
R-squared	0.00955	0.00383	0.0449	0.0181	0.198	0.0137
Birth year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Father's birthplace FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Age $\times$ Father's birthplace FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

**Notes:** The sample consists of French-born individuals born after 1980 and who were at least 20 years old at census year. Data is from the 2011 1% census microsample. "Muslim" refers to individuals whose father was born in Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco or Turkey. *Endogamous marriage* takes on the value one if the spouse is born in the same country as the individual's father. The sample in column (6) is restricted to married individuals with a spouse present in the household. Standard errors are clustered at the father's birthplace level. \*\*\* p < 0.01, \*\* p < 0.05, \* p < 0.1.


## B Additional Figures and Tables

Figure B.1. Share of girls enrolled in secondary education by birth cohort



Data is from the 2003 wave of the LFS. The sample consists of French-born women.

Figure B.2. Change in student status between spring and fall quarter, difference Muslim vs others



The figure plots estimates of the interaction coefficient between Muslim origin and survey year fixed effects from a regression of an indicator for changed student status between fall and spring quarter of the same school year, that also controls for survey year, birth cohort and father's birthplace by age fixed effects. Vertical lines denote 90% confidence intervals. The sample consists of French-born individuals aged 16 or above at survey year, who were enrolled in secondary education in the spring quarter of the previous year. Data is from the 2004–2012 LFS.

Table B.1. Summary statistics - Women

Variables	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max	N
<u>LFS Repeated cross-section</u>					
Age	23.72	3.225	20	32	52201
Muslim origin	0.080	0.271	0	1	52201
Completed secondary	0.855	0.352	0	1	52155
Out of labor force	0.374	0.484	0	1	52201
Employed	0.514	0.500	0	1	52201
Lives with parents	0.355	0.478	0	1	52201
Housework	0.050	0.218	0	1	48357
Married	0.098	0.297	0	1	52198
Has children	0.195	0.396	0	1	52201
<u>IPUMS</u>					
Age	22.896	2.704	20	33	203724
Muslim origin	0.159	0.366	0	1	203724
Completed secondary	0.899	0.300	0	1	203724
Out of labor force	0.0398	0.195	0	1	203724
Employed	0.490	0.500	0	1	203724
Housework	0.00641	0.080	0	1	203724
Married	0.0167	0.128	0	1	203724
Endogamous marriage	0.720	0.449	0	1	872
Has children	0.0268	0.161	0	1	203724
<u>TeO</u>					
Age	22.376	3.181	17	29	2642
Muslim	0.332	0.471	0	1	2608
Experienced racism in school	0.210	0.407	0	1	2642
Trust in French school	3.225	0.683	1	4	2626
Seen as French	3.0620	1.046	1	4	2566
Feel at home in France	3.630	0.650	1	4	2622
Feel French	3.559	0.743	1	4	2624
Feel [father's nationality]	2.40	1.136	1	4	664

**Notes:** Data consists of French-born women born after 1980 who were aged 20 or older at survey year. The LFS data pools survey years 2004-2012. IPUMS data is from the 2011 1% French census microsample. “Muslim” refers to women whose father was born in the Maghreb or the Middle East (LFS), in Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco or Turkey (IPUMS) and to religious identification (TeO).

Table B.2. Summary statistics - Men

Variables	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max	N
<u>LFS</u>					
Age	23.71	3.226	20	32	50852
Muslim origin	0.077	0.267	0	1	50852
Completed secondary	0.809	0.393	0	1	50768
Out of labor force	0.291	0.454	0	1	50852
Employed	0.587	0.492	0	1	50852
Lives with parents	0.475	0.499	0	1	50852
Housework	0.00164	0.0405	0	1	46840
Married	0.0569	0.232	0	1	50851
Has children	0.098	0.297	0	1	50852
<u>IPUMS</u>					
Age	23.371	2.896	20	33	310370
Muslim origin	0.140	0.347	0	1	310370
Completed secondary	0.835	0.371	0	1	310370
Out of labor force	0.043	0.202	0	1	310370
Employed	0.557	0.497	0	1	310370
Housework	0.000351	0.0187	0	1	310370
Married	0.0136	0.116	0	1	310370
Endogamous marriage	0.744	0.436	0	1	1878
Has children	0.00762	0.0869	0	1	310370
<u>TeO</u>					
Age	22.281	3.265	17	29	2597
Muslim	0.282	0.450	0	1	2556
Experienced racism in school	0.236	0.424	0	1	2597
Trust in French school	3.114	0.753	1	4	2579
Seen as French	3.064	1.056	1	4	2496
Feel at home in France	3.593	0.668	1	4	2564
Feel French	3.595	0.716	1	4	2567
Feel [father's nationality]	2.466	1.148	1	4	686

**Notes:** Data consists of French-born men born after 1980 who were aged 20 or older at survey year. The LFS data pools survey years 2004-2012. IPUMS data is from the 2011 1% French census microsample. “Muslim” refers to men whose father was born in the Maghreb or the Middle East (LFS), in Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco or Turkey (IPUMS) and to religious identification (TeO).

Table B.3. Self-reported attitudes, difference-in-differences and triple differences

Dep. Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Experienced racism in school	Trust in French school	Seen as French	Feel at home in France	Feel French	Feel [father's nationality]	Feel more [father's nationality] than French
Panel A: Women only							
Muslim × Born after 1986	0.230** (0.0789)	-0.164* (0.0811)	-0.167 (0.147)	-0.0649 (0.0483)	0.229** (0.0796)	0.709* (0.318)	0.842* (0.385)
Observations	2608	2594	1407	1455	1454	200	199
R-squared	0.0141	0.0113	0.0890	0.0401	0.0525	0.146	0.175
Birth year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Religion FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Linear Muslim-specific trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Panel A: Entire sample							
Muslim × Born after 1986	-0.155* (0.0759)	0.391*** (0.0757)	0.185 (0.172)	0.0575 (0.0905)	-0.215* (0.104)	0.277 (0.297)	0.372 (0.223)
Muslim × Born after 1986 × Female	0.386** (0.147)	-0.555*** (0.0482)	-0.352 (0.205)	-0.122 (0.0918)	0.443*** (0.117)	0.432* (0.205)	0.470 (0.378)
Observations	5164	5133	2723	2824	2824	404	401
R-squared	0.0146	0.0197	0.0933	0.0422	0.0446	0.200	0.212
Birth year × Female FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Religion × Female FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Linear Muslim-female-specific trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

**Notes:** The sample consists of French-born individuals born after 1980. Outcomes are standardized and estimated effects can be interpreted in terms of standard deviations. Data is from the Trajectories and Origins survey. Standard errors are clustered at the region level. \*\*\* p < 0.01, \*\* p < 0.05, \* p < 0.1.

## C Variable description

Variable	Description
<b>LFS</b>	
Muslim	Indicator for father born in Maghreb or Middle East. Father’s country of birth based on variable PAIPERC.
Completed secondary education	Indicator for having at least a professional secondary degree (CAP, BEP, or equivalent). Coded based on variable DIP11.
Enrolled in secondary	Indicator for currently enrolled in secondary professional (CAP, BEP) or general/technological secondary education. Coded based on variable FORNIV.
In university	Indicator for currently studying for Bachelor’s degree or higher (including Grande École, Master’s, PhD). Coded based on variable FORNIV.
Change in student status	Student status coded based on the variables ACTEU6 and FORNIV, taking on the value one for those who are currently students enrolled in secondary education. Change computed between quarter 4 (fall quarter) and quarter 2 (spring quarter of previous year), for individuals who were enrolled in secondary education in quarter 2.
Out of labor force	Indicator for individuals coded as “inactive”, based on variable ACTEU.
Employed	Indicator for individuals coded as “actively employed”, based on variable ACTEU.
Lives with parents	Indicator for individuals coded as “child of reference person” in the household, based on variable LPR.
Has children	Indicator for individuals with children present in the household, based on variable EM1.
Married	Indicator for married individuals, based on variable MATRI.
<b>IPUMS</b>	
Completed secondary	Indicator based on variable EDATTAIN.
Out of labor force	Indicator for inactive, based on variable EMPSTATD.
Employed	Indicator based on variable EMPSTAT.
Married	Indicator based on variable MARST.
Endogamous marriage	Indicator for individuals whose spouse (present in the household) was born in the same country as their father.
Has children	Indicator based on variable NCHILD.

Variable	Description
<b>TeO</b>	
Experienced racism in school	Indicator for individuals who mentioned they experienced insults or racist attitudes at school. Variable D_OURACL.C.
Trust in French school	Trust of the respondent in the French school. Variable I_ECOLE. Coded on a 4-point Likert scale (1=Trust very much, 4=Do not trust at all), and recoded, so that higher values indicate more trust.
Seen as French	Opinion of respondent on the statement: “I am seen as French.” Variable X_VUFRI. Coded on a 4-point Likert scale (1=Completely agree, 4=Completely disagree) and recoded, so that higher values indicate higher agreement.
Feel at home in France	Opinion of respondent on the statement: “I feel at home in France.” Variable X_MOIFR. Coded on a 4-point Likert scale (1=Completely agree, 4=Completely disagree) and recoded, so that higher values indicate higher agreement.
Feel French	Opinion of respondent on the statement: “I feel French.” Variable X_APPARF. Coded on a 4-point Likert scale (1=Completely agree, 4=Completely disagree) and recoded, so that higher values indicate higher agreement.
Feel [father’s nationality]	Opinion of respondent on the statement: “I feel [father’s nationality].” Variable X_APPARP. Coded on a 4-point Likert scale (1=Completely agree, 4=Completely disagree) and recoded, so that higher values indicate higher agreement.
Feel more [father’s nationality] than French	Difference between <i>Feel [father’s nationality]</i> and <i>Feel French</i> .

## D Interview protocol

### D.1 Sampling

Subjects were identified through snowball sampling. The author visited Muslim institutions (e.g. civic associations and religious classes) to recruit practicing Muslim women; in turn, they provided access to other women in their social network. The benefit of this sampling strategy is that it enables recruitment of the population most likely to be affected by government religious bans – Muslim women who self-identified as Muslim and enact this identity through their public behavior.<sup>27</sup> At the same time, the results are not representative of the experiences of all Muslim women, particularly those who identify as cultural Muslims or practice their religious identity privately. However, insights provided by this non-representative sample are consistent with the quantitative evidence provided, and can help interpret our empirical findings for the broader sample of all Muslim women.

### D.2 Mode of data collection

The mode of data collection was semi-structured interviews, with prepared questions regarding several categories: background, religious practice, evolution of (religious) identity, effects of the headscarf ban, effects of the burqa ban, and Muslim experience in France. A list of structured questions is provided below. Interviews took place in cafes, restaurants, or homes of respondents, as per respondent preferences. Five interviews occurred with another person present, often a friend who also came to be interviewed and once a significant other. Interviews lasted between thirty minutes to

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<sup>27</sup>The objective of the study in 2011 was to identify the effect of the burqa ban, which went into effect in 2010. As a result, women who strongly identified as Muslim were selected in order to better understand how the ban would affect their lives. While the project sought to understand the effect of the burqa ban, respondents were also asked about the 2004 ban, their experience in France as Muslims, and the evolution of their religious and political identities. The expansiveness of the interviews enables us to use them for this study.

two hours.

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**List of Relevant Questions**

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- Q.1 In your opinion, what unleashed the public discourse on the identity of Muslims?
  - Q.2 What were the general consequences of the 2004 headscarf ban on the Muslim community?
  - Q.3 What were the specific consequences of the 2004 law for your life, in terms of school, employment, housing, and personal interactions?
  - Q.4 How do you think the 2004 law affected the religious practices of Muslim women?
  - Q.5 Describe your own religious trajectory. When did you start veiling and why? How was your decision to veil received by educators, employers, friends, and family?
  - Q.6 What were the religious practices of your parents and family? How did these shape your own religious practices?
  - Q.7 Where did you grow up and go to school? What was the demography of those in your school and neighborhood?
  - Q.8 What does Islam signify in your life?
  - Q.9 Have you experienced discrimination directly? In what domain?
  - Q.10 Describe your family’s cultural/national background.
  - Q.11 Describe your parents’ professional and educational background.
  - Q.12 Age.
  - Q.13 Employment.
  - Q.14 Educational attainment.
  - Q.15 Civic involvement and involvement in Muslim organizations.
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Table D.2. Interviewee characteristics

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Obs
Age	27.3	6.9	18	47	20
Born before 1986	0.52	0.51	0	1	19
Attained BA	0.65	0.51	0	1	20
Attained MA	0.35	0.48	0	1	20
Attained Bac	0.95	0.22	0	1	20
Sub-Saharan Africa origin	0.25	0.44	0	1	20
Maghreb origin	0.65	0.42	0	1	20
Turkey origin	0.05	0.22	0	1	20

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