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Family History and Attitudes toward Outgroups: Evidence from the European Refugee Crisis (with Elias Dinas and Alain Schlaepfer), Journal of Politics, Forthcoming.

Secular Policies and Muslim Integration in the West: The Effects of the French Headscarf Ban (with Aala Abdelgadir), American Political Science Review, 114(3), August 2020, pp.707-723.
[Paper and Online Appendix] Media: Liberation, Economic Research Forum, Monkey Cage

Agricultural Returns to Labor and the Origins of Work Ethics (with Alain Schlaepfer), Economic Journal, 130(628), May 2020, pp.1081–1113.
[Paper and Online Appendix]

Backlash: The Unintended Effects of Language Prohibition in US Schools after World War I, Review of Economic Studies, 87(1), January 2020, pp.204-239.
[Paper] [Online Appendix] Media: Washington Post, Economist

How do Immigrants Respond to Discrimination? The Case of Germans in the US during World War I, American Political Science Review, 113(2), May 2019, pp.405-422.
[Paper] [Online Appendix] Media: LSE USCentre


Working papers

From Immigrants to Americans: Race and Assimilation during the Great Migration (with Shom Mazumder and Marco Tabellini)
Revision requested in the Review of Economic Studies
Media: Voxeu, The New York Times

Recognition of Collective Victimhood and Outgroup Prejudice (with Elias Dinas and Alain Schlaepfer) 
Revision requested in Public Opinion Quarterly

Racial Diversity, Electoral Preferences, and the Supply of Policy: The Great Migration and Civil Rights (with Alvaro Calderon and Marco Tabellini)
Media: Voxeu

Collective Remembrance and Private Choice: German-Greek Conflict and Consumer Behavior in Times of Crisis (with Hans-Joachim Voth) 

Changing In-Group Boundaries: The Effect of Immigration on Race Relations in the US (with Shom Mazumder and Marco Tabellini) 

What Works for Immigrant Integration? Lessons from the Americanization Movement 


Selected work in progress

Culture Clash: Incompatible Reputation Systems and Intergroup Conflict (with Alain Schlaepfer) 

Under which conditions does intergroup contact lead to conflict? We provide a novel answer to this question by highlighting the role of reputation mechanisms in sustaining cooperation. Punishment-based reputation (a “culture of honor”) and reputation based on image scoring (indirect reciprocity) can both deter defection in one-time interactions within groups. Yet these reputation mechanisms can be incompatible in intergroup interactions. Using a game theoretic model, we show that injecting pools of individuals from a punishment-based culture into a culture of image scoring can lead to widespread intergroup conflict. Cooperation is a more likely outcome if the cultures that interact use a similar reputation mechanism. The theoretical framework helps us explain a variety of phenomena, such as variation in immigrant crime rates and patterns of outgroup discrimination.


The Effect of Group Size on Immigrant Integration (with Kai Gehring and Marco Tabellini)